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Abstract 
In this paper relationship between the market overconfidence and occurrence 
of the stock-prices’ bubbles is investigated. Sixty participants traded in ten 
experimental markets of the two types: rational and overconfident. Markets 
are constructed on the basis of subjects’ overconfidence, measured in the 
administered pre-experimental psychological test sessions. The most 
overconfident subjects form overconfident markets, and the least overconfident 
– rational markets. Empirical evidence presented in the paper refines 
differences between market outcomes in the experimental treatments and 
suggests the connection between market overconfidence and market outcomes. 
Prices in rational markets tend to track the fundamental asset value more 
accurately than prices in overconfident markets, and are significantly lower 
and less volatile than the average overconfident prices. Strong positive 
correlation between market outcomes and overconfidence measures draws 
conclusion, that an increase in market overconfidence is associated with the 
increase in average price and trading activity. Large and significant 
correlation between bubble measures and measures of overconfidence provide 
additional evidence that overconfidence has significant effect on price and 
trading behavior in experimental asset markets.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Many different factors are continuously contributing to the changes in stock prices. As a 
consequence stock-prices’ bubbles might occur. Although different definitions of the stock 
price bubble notion exist, one thing is common to all of them: bubbles are deviations from the 
fundamental value of an asset. Fundamental asset value equals the present value of the stream 
of dividends that owner expects to receive, and therefore dividend is the only driving force of 
the asset prices. There exist several problems in determining the fundamental value of an 
asset, namely estimation of dividends on the asset through the time period, determination of 
the terminal asset value and discount rates for calculation of the present value. All these 
components can be controlled in the laboratory asset market. 
A question arises, why people pay for an asset a price that differs from its fundamental value? 
According to Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) overconfidence is the main factor which makes 
people pay higher prices, than the underlying fundamental value of an asset. Overconfidence 
is one of the psychological characteristics, stipulating deviations from rational behavior. The 
concept of overconfidence is based on the large body of evidence from cognitive 
psychological research, which suggests that human-beings overestimate their own knowledge, 
abilities and precision of their personal information. Although the beginning of 
overconfidence research lies in psychological works, the effect of overconfidence on financial 
decision making, functioning of financial markets and economic outcomes is a widely 
researched topic in behavioral economics.  
Most of the theoretical overconfidence papers are based on the initial assumption of traders’ 
overconfidence, which is modelled as overestimation of the precision of private information 
that manifests itself via underestimation of the variance of the private signal that subjects get. 
Theoretical models of overconfidence predict that overconfidence causes excess trading 
volume and excess price volatility, as well it induces occurrence of the speculative price 
bubbles. There are a few empirical and experimental studies designed to test whether 
cognitive bias of overconfidence affects financial decisions, market outcomes and subjects’ 
performance. Market experiments which are the closest in spirit to mine are by Biais, Hilton, 
Mazurier, and Pouget (2005), Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002), Deaves et al. (2009). All 
these experiments analyzed relation between measures of overconfidence and trading 
behaviour, however only Deaves et al. (2009) explore the impact of overconfidence on the 
market-level. Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) run a multi-period experimental market and 
analyze development of overconfidence of the participants in the course of the experiment. 
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Their results indicate that participants of the experiment were well-calibrated in certain 
periods, and under- or overconfident in other periods. Biais et al (2005), use psychological 
questionnaire to measure the degree of overconfidence via interval estimation tasks in a group 
of 245 students. The main conclusion of the authors is that miscalibration does not lead to an 
increase in trading activity. On the contrary, Deaves et al. (2009) in their paper report that 
greater overconfidence leads to higher trading volume. They found no evidence that 
overconfidence and trading activity are gendered.  
My experiment was constructed with the following assumptions in mind. First, previous 
experiments were not aimed at discovering the connection between the phenomenon of 
overconfidence and occurrence of stock-prices’ bubbles. Second, there were no papers that 
previously used the suggested procedure of markets’ formation, based on the participants’ 
inborn level of overconfidence, and have managed directly connect changes in markets’ 
overconfidence to the experimental outcomes. Third, previous experiments provided 
participants by private information with differences in signal quality, which itself creates 
potential for trade; in my experiment all subjects are given the same information. Fourth, to 
measure subjects’ overconfidence I use a specially tailored test, weighted for the inclusion of 
easy, hard and medium difficulty questions, which is also gender-balanced; none of the 
previous experiments makes use of such test. However, unbalanced to hard-easy effect tests 
might artificially create high levels of overconfidence; the same is valid for gender bias. Fifth, 
I use the second construct to measure markets’ overconfidence: a price-prediction task (in 
each period subjects submit their forecast of the next period’s average market price and their 
confidence in this prediction). This design also enables following the evolution of market’s 
overconfidence in the course of experiment. Both pre-experimental test and price prediction 
assignment are financially rewarded. 
In this paper results of the experiment, designed to investigate the role of market 
overconfidence in the occurrence of bubbles in the asset prices and in the emergence of other 
stylized facts of the financial market (excessive trade, excessive price volatility), are reported. 
Additional interest is paid to the examination of the extent to which such relationship exists, i.e. 
determination of the linear relationship between price bubbles and the prevailing degree of 
market overconfidence, measured as the bias score. The design of the experiment follows 
Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) and is extended by a new feature, in which markets are 
constructed on the basis of subjects’ overconfidence, assessed in pre-experimental studies. For 
the participation in the experiment two types of subjects are invited: those who have low bias 
score (rational subjects) and those who have high bias score (overconfident subjects). Of them 
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in the experiment two types of markets are formed: rational and overconfident. When there are 
no asymmetries in information and all traders have identical assets’ and currency endowments, 
and all of them are “homogenous … with statistically rational dividend and price expectations” 
(Gilette et al., 1999) a theory predicts that either no trading should occur or some marginal 
trading at the prices around the fundamental value. I assume that overconfident traders 
overestimate the probability of the occurrence of the maximum dividend value, thus they 
erroneously perceive possible future dividend income and optimistically overestimate the 
probability of existence of other traders (“greater fools”) ready to pay for the asset an even 
higher price. This results in that the participants are taking excessive risk and trade at prices 
above the fundamental asset value. Thus bubbles in the asset’s price occur. These bubbles 
usually burst several periods before the end of the experiment; research on overconfidence 
showed that overconfidence is decreasing with the task repetitiveness. Thus my second focus is 
to investigate changes in markets’ overconfidence towards the end of the game.  
Main findings from my experiment can be summarized as follows. In the ten sessions of this 
experiment, it is observed that, higher market overconfidence is accompanied by the higher 
average market prices and larger deviations of the security prices from fundamental value. 
Prices in rational markets tend to track the fundamental asset value more accurately than the 
prices in the overconfident markets, and are significantly lower than the average 
overconfident prices. Moreover, bubble and burst pattern was observed in the aggregated 
overconfident market, whereas in the rational market no sudden drop of the aggregated 
market price to the fundamental value occurred. Volatility of the prices and trade volume 
proved to be significantly lower in the rational market, as it was hypothesized. 
Overconfidence measure of the first part of the experiment is, in most markets, lower than that 
of the second part and this difference is significant. This finding could serve as an explanation 
why bubbles burst close to the end (or in some cases middle) of the experiment. Analysis of 
the bubble measures revealed that in the markets formed of overconfident subjects bubbles are 
more likely to occur and that they are significantly larger in magnitude than in rational 
markets. Large and significant correlation between bubble measures and measures of 
overconfidence provide additional evidence that overconfidence has significant effect on price 
and trading behavior in experimental asset markets. 
Paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 a brief overview of the findings of psychological
1
 and 
financial literature on overconfidence are given; along analysis of the similar work and 
                                                 
1
 A detailed discussion of the relevant literature is provided in the working paper “Development of the 
overconfidence measurement instrument for the economic experiment”. 
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discussion of the paper’s contributions is presented. In Section 3 the research hypotheses are 
listed. In Section 4 details of the pre-experimental overconfidence measurement are provided. 
Section 5 provides description of experimental design. In Section 6 data analysis is presented, 
and, finally Section 7 concludes. 
2 OVERCONFIDENCE 
2.1 OVERCONFIDENCE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
The beginning of the overconfidence research in finance and economics lies in psychological 
works. In psychological research overconfidence is defined as a prevalent tendency to 
overestimate one’s skills, prospects for success, the probability of positive outcomes or the 
accuracy of one’s knowledge. Phenomenon of overconfidence has been found in many 
different samples of the population, e.g. students (Fischhoff et al.,1977; Koriat et al., 1980, 
Zakay and Glicksohn, 1992), members of the armed forces (Hazard and Peterson, 1973), CIA 
analysts (Cambridge and Shreckengost, 1978), entrepreneurs (Baron, 2000), clinical 
psychologists (Oskamp, 1962), bankers (Staël von Holstein, 1972), executives (Moore, 1977), 
negotiators (Neale and Bazerman, 1990), managers (Russo and Schoemaker,1992), lawyers 
(Wagenaar and Keren, 1986), and civil engineers (Hynes and Vanmarcke, 1976); 
overconfidence is already present in children (see Powel and Bolich, 1993; Allwood, 
Granhag, and Jonsson, 2006). 
Confidence and uncertainty In our life, many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the 
likelihood of uncertain events (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). These beliefs can be expressed 
in numerical form as subjective probabilities. Subjective probabilities are the probabilities that 
people generate in their own minds to express their uncertainty about the possibility of the 
occurrence of various events or outcomes (Bar-Hillel, 2001). If over the long run, for all 
predictions made with some specific confidence, the actual proportion of correct outcomes 
equals the probability assigned, a person is considered to be well calibrated. Overconfidence, 
or miscalibration, concerns the fact that people overestimate how much they actually know: 
when they are P-percent sure that they have answered the question correctly or predicted (the 
outcome) correctly, they are in fact right on average less that P-percent of the time (Bar-
Hillel, 2001). Optimistic overconfidence is a specific form of overprediction, based on 
overestimation of the probability of events thought to be beneficial to the judge (Griffin and 
Brenner, 2005). Most of the people are not well-calibrated and demonstrate overconfidence. 
Overconfidence can also be defined with respect to subjective confidence intervals (Kirchler 
and Maciejovsky, 2002). The assessor has to state values of the uncertain quantity that are 
 6 
associated with a small number of predetermined fractiles of the distribution. The usual 
finding is that the subjects’ probability distributions are too tight. In the study of Alpert and 
Raiffa (1982) fifty-percent intervals included the true quantity only about 30 percent of the 
time; 98 percent intervals, only 60 percent of the time.  
The degree of overconfidence is connected to the complexity of the task, and is the highest 
with the tasks of high difficulty (e.g. Clarke, 1960; and Pitz, 1974). As tasks get easier, 
overconfidence is reduced (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). Russo and Schoemaker (1992) note that 
being well calibrated is a teachable, learnable skill, which is demonstrated by the example of 
weather forecasters, who significantly improved accuracy of their forecast predictions and 
became one of the best ever calibrated group of subjects. Lichtenstein et al., (1982) conclude 
that continuance, repetitiveness of the task and the fact that, the outcome feedback for weather 
forecasters is well defined and promptly received, have high impact on accuracy of their 
predictions. There are two ways to achieve better subjects’ calibration, which according to 
Lichtenstein et al. (1982) are motivation through reward for their assessment to be more 
precise, and outcome feedback
2
.  
2.2 OVERCONFIDENCE IN FINANCIAL RESEARCH AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Following the psychological research in overconfidence, interest in the consequences of 
economic subjects’ overconfidence on financial decision making, functioning of markets and 
economic outcomes has occurred in behavioral economics. Theoretical models of 
overconfidence predict that overconfidence causes excess trading volume (De Bondt and 
Thaler, 1985; Shiller, 2000; Benos, 1998; Caballé and Sákovics, 2003), and excess price 
volatility (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Benos, 1998, Daniel et al., 1998); it induces 
occurrence of the speculative price bubbles (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) and increases 
market depth (Odean, 1999; Kyle and Wang, 1997; Benos, 1998); it makes markets 
underreact to abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information and overreact to salient, but 
less relevant information (Odean, 1998); it makes returns of financial assets predictable 
(Daniel et al., 1998, 2001; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003); overconfidence increases investors’ 
tendency to herd (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1994) and makes them choose 
riskier and undiversified portfolios (Odean, 1998, 1999; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992), overconfident investors trade more aggressively, i.e. their trading activity is too high 
(Odean, 1999; Gervais and Odean, 2001) and their expected utility is reduced (De Long et al., 
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 Moreover, receiving outcome feedback after every assessment is the best condition for successful training 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1982). 
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1991; Odean, 1998). Most of these papers are based on the initial assumption of traders’ 
overconfidence, which is modelled as overestimation of the precision of private information 
that manifests itself via underestimation of the variance of the private signal that subjects get, 
or, in other words, too tight confidence intervals for the value of the risky asset (Glaser and 
Weber, 2007).  
There are a few empirical and experimental studies designed to test the impact of 
overconfidence on financial decisions, market outcomes and subjects’ performance. Some of 
them present only an indirect evidence of such impact, as they measure overconfidence via 
different proxies and it is not always clear who of the subjects and how strong are 
overconfident. For example Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) test the hypothesis of 
interdependence between overconfidence and high trading volume for the USA stock market. 
As a proxy for the degree of overconfidence authors suggest using the high past returns, i.e. 
they argue that after high past returns posterior volume of trade will be higher, as successful 
investment increases the degree of overconfidence. These conclusions are supported by Kim 
and Nofsinger (2003) for the Japanese stock market. Barber and Odean (2001) proxy 
overconfidence by the gender of the trader, i.e. their proposition is that, based on the 
psychological literature, women are less overconfident than men, thus they are going to trade 
less than men. In their study men were actually found to trade more than women.  
A much clearer results are obtained through test-studies, enabling direct observation whether 
an examined person overestimate their knowledge, or underestimate variance of sock returns 
etc. For example, Menkhoff, Schmidt and Brozynski (2006) surveyed 117 fund managers in 
order to detect an impact of experience on overconfidence, risk taking, and herding behavior. 
However, only experiments enable a direct test of the hypothesis that a certain degree of 
overconfidence leads to a specific market outcome, expressed as some of the market 
parameters, e.g. average price, or trade volume. Market experiments which are the closest in 
spirit to mine were conducted by Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005), Kirchler and 
Maciejovsky (2002), Deaves et al. (2009). All these experiments analyzed relation between 
measures of overconfidence and trading behaviour.  
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) run a multi-period experimental market and analyze 
development of overconfidence of the participants in the course of the experiment. 
Miscalibration of subjects was measured before each trading period, via the two price 
prediction tasks: point prediction and interval prediction. Their results indicate that 
participants of the experiment were well-calibrated in certain periods, and under- or 
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overconfident in other periods. They also find that higher degree of overconfidence is 
negatively correlated with the earnings of the participants of the experiment.  
Biais et al (2005), use psychological questionnaire to measure, among other psychological 
traits, the degree of overconfidence via interval estimation tasks in a group of 245 students. 
Several weeks later after the students’ overconfidence was measured they participated in an 
experimental asset market. The main conclusions of the authors are, that although 
miscalibration does not lead to an increase in trading activity it reduces trading performance 
of the subjects, and miscalibrated traders show “excessive confidence in their assessment of 
the value of asset”, which eventually causes mistakes in financial decision making. 
Miscalibration reduces profits for men, whereas has no significant effect on women.  
Deaves et al. (2009), conduct their experiment in order to test premises that overconfidence 
leads to an increase in trading activity, and that gender influences trading activity through 
differences in overconfidence. Compared to the two abovementioned experiments Deaves et 
al. (2009), instead of a multi-period experiment, conduct a battery of 12 single-period markets 
per experimental session and they use an increased up to 20 questions test consisting of the 
interval estimation tasks. To some of their sessions subjects were assigned based on their 
gender, and to some based on the overconfidence measure (OC). The values of OC measure 
used in the experiment of Deaves et al. (2009) show that all their subjects were extremely 
overconfident
3
. The main finding reported in their paper is that greater overconfidence leads 
to higher trading volume and leads to reduced earnings, but there is no evidence that 
overconfidence and trading activity are gendered.  
My experiment was constructed with the following assumptions in mind: 
First of all, most of the previous experiments concentrate on the connection between 
overconfidence and high market trade volume, and none of them was aimed at discovering the 
connection between the phenomenon of overconfidence and the occurrence of the bubbles in 
asset prices.  
Second, there were no papers that previously used suggested procedure of markets formation, 
based on the participants’ inborn level of overconfidence, and have managed directly connect 
changes in traders’ psychological characteristics to the experimental market outcomes. 
Although Deaves et al. (2009), as mentioned above, run several sessions to which subjects 
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 In the experiment of Deaves et al. (Deaves et al. (2004) OC measure is constructed so as to vary in the interval 
[0, 1], where 1 points at extreme overconfidence. A well-calibrated person’s OC score is 0.1, and values below 
point at underconfidence. However none of their subjects comes close to 0.1, the lowest OC being equal to 0.45. 
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were assigned by the degree of overconfidence, the issue of association of overconfidence 
with price-bubble was not in their focus, and therefore not explored. Not to mention, that they 
utilized a different overconfidence measurement methodology, and opted for different market 
structure (a battery of one-period markets per session vs. one multi-period market). 
Third, previous experiments provided participants by private information with differences in 
signal quality, which according to Glaser et al. (2007) already creates a potential for trade
4
. 
E.g. in the experiment of Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) half of the participants had no 
information about the dividend distribution, and the other half had complete information. 
Experimental approach of Biais et al. (2005) relies on the asymmetric information trading 
game, where traders observe different private signals: bullish, bearish, and neutral. Deaves et 
al. (2009), also supply their subjects with different, in terms of quality, signals that depend on 
the results of the pre-experimental test. Moreover they try to manipulate the subjects’ beliefs 
so that they think that their signals are more accurate. I do not create artificial belief in being 
better or possessing a piece of a more qualitative information. Instead all subjects are given 
the same information and I believe that only such approach enables the refinement of the pure 
differences between the two experimental groups.  
Fourth, economic experiments on overconfidence measure the inborn level of subjects’ 
overconfidence via the different tasks and tests, and in previous experiments overconfidence 
might have been caused (to some extent) by other reasons than the imperfection of human 
nature, namely by mistakes in the development of tests/tasks. E.g. findings from the 
psychological research show that overconfidence is the most pronounced for the hard 
questions (few people know the right answer) and the least for the easy (most of the people 
give a correct answer) questions. However, none of the abovementioned papers makes use of 
the balanced to hard-easy effect tests. This could have artificially created high levels of under- 
or overconfidence. For example in the experiment of Deaves et al. (2009) none of the subjects 
gets even close to the perfect calibration measure, and even the best calibrated participants 
exhibit rather high degree of overconfidence
5
. I created the specially tailored test, weighted 
for the inclusion of easy, hard and medium difficulty questions (also accounting for the 
possible gender bias) that was pre-tested and used with students enrolled in different 
disciplines of the social sciences. Compared to some of the authors, my test is expanded to 
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 If investors receive different pieces of private information about the uncertain value of the risky asset, there is 
heterogeneity between investors and thus a potential for trade (Glaser et al, 2003). 
5
 This also raises doubts in the validity of their division of subjects in low and high overconfidence markets.  
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include more questions. Both overconfidence test and price prediction assignment are 
financially rewarded, which increases reliability of the overconfidence measurements.  
And last but not least, I use two constructs to measure subjects’ overconfidence: a general 
knowledge based, and based on the stock-price prediction task. Biais et al. (2003) and Deaves 
et al. (2009) use only general-knowledge tasks, where overconfidence is being estimated via 
the interval estimation tasks. In the experiment of Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) a pre-
experimental overconfidence measurement did not occur, but rather, overconfidence was 
measured in the course of the experiment via the price prediction task. My design makes 
possible not only the evaluation of the students’ pre-experimental degree of overconfidence, 
and based on that, division of students into two different types of market, but also the 
construction of the measure of the change in the markets’ overconfidence from the first half of 
the experiment to the second. This enables more confident inference about the connection 
between the development of overconfidence and the bubble burst.  
3 HYPOTHESES 
Investment decisions in the experimental market are based on beliefs concerning the 
likelihood of the two kinds of independent uncertain events: 1) size of dividend at the end of 
the period and 2) probability to resell to the party willing to pay even more. I assume that 
subjective probabilities generated by overconfident traders make them overestimate the 
probability of the occurrence of the maximum dividend value, thus traders erroneously 
perceive possible future dividend income and optimistically overestimate the probability of 
existence of the irrational traders (“greater fools”) ready to pay for the asset an even higher 
price. This results in that the participants are taking excessive risk and trade at prices above 
the fundamental asset value, and are even higher than the maximum possible dividend value. 
Both these reasons create a fertile field for the occurrence of the bubble in the experimental 
asset’s price. Following this discussion the first hypotheses is formulated:  
H1. Trade in the two types of constructed markets will follow such patterns: 
1. Rational market: 
 No trade or trade around the fundamental value (average expected dividends)  
 Investors trade relatively infrequently (low trading volume) 
 Prices are not too volatile relative to fundamentals 
 No bubble-crash pattern observed 
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2. Overconfident (irrational market): 
 Trade at prices around maximum possible dividend value and trade at irrationally 
high prices i.e. exceeding the maximum possible dividend value. 
 Excessive trade volume. 
 Observed bubble and burst pattern  
The second hypothesis is based on the work of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) and 
findings from psychological literature. Experiments by SSW (1988) showed that bubble/burst 
pattern is persisting scenario in the markets with inexperienced agents. Usually bubbles burst 
several periods before the end of the trading game. Research on overconfidence showed that 
overconfidence is decreasing in experts or with the task repetitiveness (see Sieber, 1974; Pitz, 
1974; Lichtenstein et. al., 1980; Russo and Schoemaker, 1992). Also optimism diminishes with 
experience (Fraser and Green, 2006). Thus a second hypothesis is postulated: 
H2: Reduction in overconfidence causes bubbles’ crash. Overconfidence is reduced with 
experience. 
As mentioned earlier subjects can be trained to be better calibrated by motivating them 
financially to be more precise in their predictions, and by giving them feedback on their 
predictions’ results. These both conditions are fulfilled in the experiment. Thus in the course 
of the trading game participants gain experience in it, and supported by market information 
about the results of their repeated actions turn into being “experts” of the game. Expertise 
should improve calibration of the subjects and bring about changes in their trade patterns (e.g. 
decrease in trading volume and price), causing stock price bubble’s crash. Thus bubble bursts 
as participants turn being better calibrated, and correct their subjective probabilities 
downwards. 
4 PRE-EXPERIMENTAL OVERCONFIDENCE MEASUREMENT 
Pre-experimental psychological test sessions were conducted during several lectures on 
economics at the Chriatian-Albrechts University of Kiel. In each of the chosen classes, 
students were announced that they had an opportunity to take part in the short experiment on 
the voluntarily basis, for which a general knowledge quiz had to be filled out. For this activity 
15 minutes were given. Participants of each pre-experimental session competed for the three 
prizes of 30, 20 and 10 EUR, which were awarded to those who answered the most questions 
right. Before the students started with the tests, a planned market experiment was advertised, 
and those subjects who were eager to take part in the economic experiment were encouraged 
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to mark their interest on the tests by ticking the “I’m interested in participation in further 
experiments” option and leaving their contact in the form of an e-mail address.  
The pre-experimental quiz consisted of the 18 general knowledge questions unrelated to 
economics, financial markets or experiments
6
. Every question had three answer alternatives, 
only one of which was right. After answering each question participants had to state how 
confident they were that the answer was right. For this purpose they could use any number in 
the range from 33%, meaning complete uncertainty, to 100% - complete certainty.  
The overconfidence (underconfidence) of each participant was measured as the bias score. 
The bias score of an individual was calculated as the difference between the mean confidence 
level across all questions and the proportion of correct answers: 
bias score = average % confidence – average % correct      (1) 
A positive bias score represented overconfidence, and a negative bias score represented 
underconfidence. A bias score of zero indicated accurately calibrated person (neutral person). 
This pre-experimental procedure allowed the author to obtain a large pool of students with 
their estimated bias scores in her database, and to ensure that the two stages of the experiment 
were perceived by the students as two rather non-associated experiments. Based on the pre-
experimental calibration test individuals were divided into two groups – the least and the most 
overconfident, which are further on called correspondingly rational and overconfident 
subjects. Students were addressed through the e-mails according to their overconfidence and 
invited to register for the suggested experimental sessions. All students of a specific type of 
the calibration were approached at the same time and were given several possible experiment 
days for their choice, thus subgroups participating in different experimental sessions differed 
in their average overconfidence within the two main groups (rational and overconfident).  
More than two hundred students showed interest in the forthcoming economic experiment. A 
database of the interested persons included information on 222 students’ name, age, 
nationality, direction of studies, semester and overconfidence score. Potential experimental 
subjects were undergraduate and graduate students of economics, business administration and 
other social science disciplines, aged from 19 to 43 years (M = 22.95, SD = 2.73). Of those 
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 Questions were not connected to economics, as otherwise it could cause biased results if the same questionnaire 
was used with the heterogeneous pool of subjects the experimenter had in her disposition. Deaves et al., (2008) 
also motivate their choice of non-economic questions by the attempt “to avoid giving either group of participants 
a relative advantage because of subject content”. 
 13 
only nine percent were of non-German nationality (19 non-German, and 203 German). 
Consistent with the previous research, subjects in the database on average were prone to 
overconfidence (M = 11.78, SD = 10.58).  
Appendix A presents data on the bias scores of the various (pre-)experimental subgroups: all 
participants who were in the database, all students who participated in the experimental 
sessions (a subsample of those in the database), and their subsamples – men, women, 
participants of rational, and overconfident markets. All groups seemed to be extremely 
overconfident, except for the participants of the rational market. A hypothesis of the equality 
of the average overconfidence of different subgroups was tested against the alternative that 
different subgroups varied by their overconfidence levels. The mean equality hypothesis is 
failed to be rejected for the difference between overconfidence of male versus female 
experiment participants in the whole sample as well as among overconfident/ rational 
participants; however the overconfidence equality hypotheses for the male and female pre-
experimental test participants is rejected. The bias score of the participants of the 
overconfident markets is significantly higher than of those of the rational markets.  
5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
5.1 PARTICIPANTS 
A set of nine experimental sessions was conducted at the Christian-Albrechts University of 
Kiel between November and May 2008-2009. For each session six participants were recruited 
from the undergraduate and graduate students in economics, business administration and other 
social science disciplines who had not previously participated in a similar asset market 
experiment
7
. Seventy four people took part in experimental sessions, of them 60 people 
actually traded in the experimental markets. Thirty five males and 25 females, aged 19 to 28 
(M = 22.73, SD = 2.06) participated in the experimental sessions. 87% of the participants 
were of German nationality. Thirty five subjects studied economics, 18 – business 
management, and 7 were students of the other social science disciplines. Approximate time 
required to conduct the experiment was 1 hour and 40 minutes. Subjects earned on average 
390.36 ECU (10.54 EUR) (SD = 197.89) on the asset market (without the reward for the 
forecasting activity). Men earned on average more ECUs than women: women 335 ECU and 
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 Inexperienced subjects were chosen, because Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) found that, when 
participants had little or no previous experience in asset markets the markets exhibited price bubbles and crashes 
rather than tracked the fundamental value.  
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men 447 ECU. This difference is significant (Mann-Whitney Z = -2.646, p < 0.01, one-sided). 
Instructions familiarized participants with the rules of the experimental market. English 
translation of instructions is included in Appendix B. 
5.2 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE AND THE RULES OF THE GAME 
All experimental sessions were conducted in the computer lab. Six players participated in 
each of the experimental asset markets. Subjects could take part in only one experimenta l 
session and only in that type of the market (rational/overconfident) to which they were 
appointed based on the results of the psychological test. The experiment was programmed 
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
At the beginning of the typical session students were given time to read the detailed 
instructions and ask the questions. At the end of the time devoted for reading the instructions 
experimenter again repeated the most important information at which students should pay 
attention, to ensure that everyone understood the rules of the game. Two trial periods 
followed, during which students could familiarize themselves with the experimental software, 
and were allowed to ask questions if something was unclear them. Both prior to the trial 
periods and after them subjects were informed that these periods had no impact on their 
results. 
Experimental design followed the pioneering work of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) 
with slight changes in the price forecasting task, and was performed as a continuous 
anonymous double auction. Every experimental market consisted of the sequence of 15 
trading periods lasting at most 180 seconds during which each trader could post her bid and 
ask price of the asset unit. Therefore each participant could purchase asset units for their 
inventory by spending an amount of their working capital equal to the purchase price, or sell 
the inventory units and increase their working capital by an amount equal to the unit’s sale 
price. Prior to the start of the experiment each trader was endowed with an equal amount of 
experimental assets and cash: 300 units of experimental currency (ECU) and 3 units of the 
experimental asset. At the end of the trading period, each asset in the inventory of the 
participants paid a dividend with possible values of 0.0, 0.8, 2.8, or 6.0 ECU. Probability of 
each dividend value was 0.25. Thus on average, through many draws subjects could expect a 
2.4 ECU value dividend. Fundamental value of the stock is found according to the formula n 
× 2.4 ECUs, where n stands for the number of periods remaining to the end of the session. 
Thus in round 1, the expected fundamental value from the dividend stream was 15 × 2.4 = 36 
ECUs per each share; in every subsequent period it fell by 2.4 ECUs. 
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As the trading period was over, participants were shown market summary information from 
the past trading periods, and were asked to predict the average market price for the next 
period as well as to state how confident they were that their price forecast was correct. To 
express their confidence subjects could use any value between 0% and 100%, where 0% 
meant complete disbelief that the forecast could be true, and 100% meant complete belief that 
the forecast was correct. Participants were paid for their predictions based on their accuracy. 
Each period subjects were given feedback on their accuracy and their reward for the price 
forecasting task. Point estimation form of price prediction task, e.g. used by SSW (1988), was 
chosen over price interval estimation form due to several reasons. First, overconfidence 
measure obtained through interval estimation in the article by Kirchler and Maciejovsky 
(2002) did not vary in time and remained in the area of overconfidence; however, their point-
estimate measure varied in time and took values from overconfident, to well-calibrated, and 
underconfident. Second, this form of price prediction task enabled comparison between pre-
experimental and post experimental overconfidence measures.  
5.3 INCENTIVES 
A typical experiment lasted 1 hour and 40 minutes, and at the end of it subjects were paid in 
cash the amount of money that was based on their final working capital converted at the 
predefined exchange rate to Euros. Final working capital (FWC) equalled:  
FWC = (300 ECU starting capital) + (dividend earnings) + (stock sales revenue) -                             
(stock purchase cost)             (2) 
In order to motivate students they were offered an hourly reward, which was comparable to 
what on average an hour of the “student-job” in Germany pays8, thus the asset market offered 
participants on average 7 EUR per hour of the experiment; for the whole experiment 
participants could expect to get on average 11 EUR. 
Reward for the accuracy of predictions was constructed to be an additional income source in 
order to reduce mechanical participation and encourage conscious engagement into this 
activity. The closer the prediction was to the actual average market price, the higher was the 
reward. The reward scheme used in the experiment was similar to the suggested by Haruvy, 
Lahav, and Noussair (2007)
9
:  
                                                 
8
 To author’s knowledge in the job market students could get on average 7 to 8 EUR. 
9
 This incentive scheme instead of a quadratic scoring rule was chosen for the sake of keeping the instructions 
simple (Haruvy et al., 2007). 
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Level of Accuracy Reward 
Within 10% of actual price 3 ECU 
Within 25% of actual price 1 ECU 
Within 50% of actual price 0.5 ECU 
Both monetary reward and the feedback about their predictions’ accuracy were used for 
improving the subjects’ calibration in the price prediction task.  
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
6.1 NUMERICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO TYPES OF THE MARKET 
In this section various numerical characteristics of the two types of the market are compared. 
Each session counts as one observation. Totally ten market sessions were conducted: five 
sessions for the overconfident market, and five sessions for the rational market. If not stated 
otherwise, all data for each type of the market are ranked from the lowest to the highest. 
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Figure 1: Average trade prices in both types of markets 
I start by the comparison of the average contract prices in the rational and overconfident 
markets. Figure 1 demonstrates that on average prices in the overconfident market tend to be 
higher than in the rational market. The average market price for the rational markets was 33 
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ECUs (SD = 9.41
10
) and for the overconfident market 67 ECUs (SD = 16.02
10
). Statistical test 
of the difference between the average prices supports the initial conclusion from the visual 
analysis - average prices in the overconfident market are significantly higher than the rational 
market prices (Mann-Whitney U = 0.0, p < 0.01, one-sided). Now I turn to the comparison of 
the average prices obtained in the experiment to the average intrinsic value of the asset 
(fundamental value) 19.20 ECU. Figure 1 indicates that experimental average prices exceed 
the average fundamental value (from now on FV). Wilcoxon Signed Rank test supports that 
prices both in the rational and in the overconfident markets are higher than the fundamental 
value (Wilcoxon T = 1.89, p < 0.05, one-sided), i.e. prices in both types of the experimental 
market are shifted to the right from the fundamental value. 
Evolution of the Average Price 
Figure 2 presents the development of the joint average transaction prices for all five rational 
and all five overconfident markets. On the horizontal axis trading periods are indicated; 
vertical axis measures average price of the transaction for that period. Fundamental asset 
value, which is found as the sum of the expected dividends for the periods left till the end of 
the game, is presented alongside.  
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Figure 2: Development of the average market price 
                                                 
10
 Here aggregated average price and the standard deviation, which are based on the five average prices for each 
type of the market, are presented.  
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Visual data analysis suggests that prices deviate from the fundamental values in both types of 
the market. However prices in the rational market deviate from the fundamental value to a 
smaller extent than in the overconfident market. Although prices in both types of the market 
stay away from the fundamental value for almost the whole duration of the session, prices in 
the rational market tend to track the fundamental asset value more accurately than prices in 
the overconfident market. It can also be seen that in the aggregated overconfident market the 
bubble and burst pattern is more pronounced than in the aggregated rational market, where no 
sudden drop of the aggregated market price to the fundamental value is observed. 
Volatility  
Prior to the experiment I hypothesized that prices in the rational market would be less volatile 
than in the overconfident market. Figure 3 presents price variations in both types of the 
market, measured as standard deviations
11
. Initial analysis suggests that this intuition was 
right. The conducted Mann Whitney U test confirms that variation in prices in the 
overconfident markets are significantly higher than in the rational markets (Mann-Whitney U 
= 4, p < 0.05, one-sided). For both types of the market, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test enabled 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the volatility of the prices was not less than the volatility 
of the fundamental value at the significance level of 0.05 (Wilcoxon T = 1.89, p < 0.05, one-
sided) in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the median volatility of rational/ 
overconfident market exceeded the volatility of the fundamental value (SD = 10.73).  
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5
Observation
S
t.
 d
e
v
. 
o
f 
m
a
rk
e
t 
p
ri
c
e
s
RAT
OVE
 
Figure 3: Volatility of asset prices in both types of markets 
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 Based on all prices of that market. 
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Trading Activity 
In this subsection measure of market volume is introduced – average asset turnover rate 
(market turnover). Market turnover is obtained by dividing the number of the asset units 
traded in that market by the total number of the asset units in that market (18 units in our 
case).  
I start by testing if the propositions of the No-Trade Theorem by Milgrom and Stokey (1982) 
applied in the conducted experimental markets. This theorem states that rational agents who 
differ from each other only in terms of information and who have no reason to trade in the 
absence of information will not trade (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Even though one type of 
the market was constructed so as to be on average rational and there was no private 
information Figure 4 suggests that trading activity in neither market is zero. Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank test of the hypothesis that there was no trading activity in the overconfident/rational 
market is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the trading activity is significantly 
higher than zero (Wilcoxon T = 1.896, p < 0.05, one-sided).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Average trading activity (turnover) in both types of markets  
Trading activity in the rational market is lower than in the overconfident one: average market 
turnover in rational market sessions is 28% (5 units of asset) and 44% (8 units of asset) in 
overconfident. Mann-Whitney U Test was conducted to test if the average asset turnover rate 
in rational markets was the same as in overconfident markets, or whether alternatively market 
turnover in overconfident markets was higher. Trading in overconfident markets is found to 
be significantly higher than in rational markets (Mann-Whitney U = 1.5, p < 0.05, one-sided).  
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Evolution of the joint average market turnover for five experimental sessions of rational 
market and five overconfident markets is shown in Appendix C. It can be observed that the 
joint average market turnover decreased over the trade periods in both types of markets. 
Increase in trading activity in the last period can be attributed to the so-called end-game 
effect
12
. 
6.2 OVERCONFIDENCE MEASURE FROM THE FORECASTING TASK 
Bias score (BS) from the price forecasting task was calculated for each session separately, as 
an average from all participants’ forecasts about the next period’s average price and their 
confidence in the answer. The score was calculated based on the “binary” methodology: if the 
average price was equal to the forecast it got a weight of 1, if not – 0. Overconfidence 
measure from the pre-experimental test is strongly correlated with the overconfidence 
measure from the forecasting task (Spearman's rho (8) = 0.65, p < 0.05, one-sided). According 
to Cohen, (1988) this correlation coefficient is considered to be large, thus I assume that both 
constructs measure the same phenomenon. This result also suggests that overconfidence is a 
robust phenomenon in our sample. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 2 3 4 5
Observation
B
ia
s
 s
c
o
re
 (
fo
re
c
a
s
ti
n
g
)
RAT
OVE
R
 
Figure 5: Average overconfidence in both types of markets 
Figure 5 indicates that on average the bias score from the price forecasting task was higher in 
the overconfident markets than in the rational ones. On average overconfidence in price 
prediction task differed between the two types of market by 10 units (BS in rational markets 
                                                 
12
 The end-game effect occurs in repeated-round experiments, and is defined as the change in subjects’ behavior 
that is attributed to the end of the experiment rather than being a part of subjects’ behavior during the course of 
the experiment.  
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M = 50.08 (SD = 8.96); in overconfident markets M = 60.31 (SD = 5.02). BS value for the 
overconfident market is significantly higher than the BS for the rational market (Mann-
Whitney U = 4.0, p < 0.05, one-sided). 
Evolution of the Bias Score 
To check if the proposition that overconfidence reduces to the end of the game compared to 
the beginning of the game holds true in the conducted experimental sessions, data on price 
prediction task were divided into two time intervals of seven periods in each, and two 
overconfidence measures for each market were calculated: one score for the first seven 
periods BS(2-8), and the second for the last seven periods BS(9-15). Figure 6 demonstrates 
that for most of the markets overconfidence measures calculated from the data on the price 
prediction for the first seven periods are higher than those calculated from the seven last 
periods. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test confirms that BS(2-8) are significantly higher than 
BS(9-15) (Z = -2.429, p < 0.01, one-sided). This finding could serve as an explanation why 
bubbles burst close to the end (or in some cases middle) of the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. 
Figure 6: Comparisons of BS(2-8) and BS(9-15): a. rational market; b. overconfident market 
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Relationship between Overconfidence and Market Parameters 
To check if the constructs that are used to measure overconfidence are related to the 
experimental results, analysis of correlation between the market parameters (specifically 
average market prices and the measure of trading activity) and the bias scores found from the 
pre-experimental overconfidence measurement and from the price prediction task is 
conducted. A positive significant linear relationship between the constructs and the average 
market price was found (pre-experimental BS: Spearman’s rho (8) = 0.75, p < 0.01, one-
tailed; forecasting BS: Spearman’s rho (8) = 0.71, p < 0.05, one-tailed). These correlation 
coefficients are considered to be large. It can be concluded that an increase in overconfidence 
is associated with an increase in average prices.  
Linear relationship between the bias scores found from the pre-experimental overconfidence 
measurement and found from price prediction, and average trade volume for the whole 
sample is found to be large (pre-experimental BS: Spearman’s rho (8) = 0.69, p < 0.05, one-
tailed; forecasting BS: Spearman’s rho (8) = 0.58, p < 0.05, one-tailed). This is in line with 
the previous research, which found that the increase in overconfidence was paired with the 
increase in the trading activity, and the decrease in overconfidence was paired with the 
decrease in trading activity.  
6.3 FORECASTING PRECISION 
In this section precision of the forecasting activity for the two types of markets is analyzed. I 
start by graphical comparison of the average price predictions to the average market 
transaction prices to see whether any conclusions can be drawn about which type of the 
players (rational or overconfident) was better in forecasting. Figure 7 indicates that the 
differences between players’ predictions and actual prices are small for both types of the 
markets, thus no clear conclusion can be drawn.  
To conduct a statistical test of which group provided more accurate forecasts, differences 
between the average forecast and the average transaction prices are taken for the each type of 
the market. Then the hypothesis is tested, that the difference between the average forecast and 
the average market price equals to zero, versus the alternative one that the difference is not 
zero, or more than zero. After conducting the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for the rational market (Z = 1.079, p = 0.28, two-sided). In the case of the 
overconfident market it is concluded that the forecasts tend to over-predict the real market 
price significantly (Z = 1.89, p < 0.05, one-sided). 
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b. 
Figure 7: Average forecast and market price: a. rational market; b. overconfident market 
In a following step, a test is run if there is a linear relationship between the price prediction 
and the price. An almost one to one correspondence between the average forecast and the 
average market price is found (Spearman’s Rho (8) = 0.997, p < 0.001, one-tailed), which 
could mean that on average the convergence of beliefs occurred, alongside with the 
“anchoring” of the subjects on their predicted price values while trading in the market in order 
to make more money. 
6.4 BUBBLE MEASURES  
From the previous analysis I obtained some evidence, that although prices, volatility and 
turnover in rational markets are significantly lower than in overconfident markets, they are 
still much higher than I have initially hypothesized, and that rational market might also be 
prone to bubbles, but of a smaller magnitude. Thus in this section experimental treatments 
will be analyzed in terms of their effect on the bubble’s size. I use several measures of the 
magnitude of bubbles in laboratory markets that were developed by previous authors (e.g. 
King et al., 1993; Van Boening et al., 1993; Porter and Smith, 1995 as in Noussair and 
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Tucker, 2003; Dufwenberg et al., 2005). These measures are: Haessel-R2, Price Amplitude, 
Normalized Absolute Deviation, Normalized Average Deviation, and Velocity. Table 1 
reports the values of the measures by session and treatment. Appendix D presents graphs of 
average market prices and turnover values per period in each of the ten markets. 
The Hassel-R
2
 (Haessel, 1978) measures goodness-of-fit between average market price per 
period and the intrinsic asset value. It determines how well the variation in actual market 
prices (around their mean) is accounted for by the variation in the fundamental value (around 
its mean), or, in other words, the proportion of the variation in market price which can be 
explained by variation in fundamental value. Hassel-R
2
 converges to 1 if trading prices 
converge to fundamental values
13
. It is estimated by the R
2
 associated to the regression of 
market prices on the fundamentals, where fundamental value is seen as an estimator for the 
average market price obtained from some linear model. A comparison of average contract 
prices obtained from the rational market with those obtained from the overconfident one, 
reveals that variation in the average prices in the rational market fit variation in the intrinsic 
value better in most of the sessions. Thus goodness of fit measure is significantly higher in 
rational markets (Mann-Whitney U = 3, p < 0.05, one-sided). 
The Normalized (Average) Price Deviation is calculated by summing up all deviations of 
market contract prices from fundamental value and dividing this sum by the total number of 
stocks in the market (see Equation 3). 
 
TSN
DEP
NPD
q
i iti   1
)(
                  (3) 
Here, Pit is the price of the ith share in period t, q is the number of contracts in period t, and 
TSN is the total number of shares in the market
14
. This measure is calculated for each of the 
periods. Table 1 presents average value for each of the markets.  
From the analysis of the NPD it can be determined whether stocks in that period were 
overpriced or underpriced relative to the fundamental value (a value of under- or 
overvaluation per-share). Average market value of the NDP can be treated as an indicator of 
the aggregated average under- or overvaluation per-stock in that market. Figure 8 depicts, for 
each of the two types of asset market, normalized price deviations from fundamental value per 
period. Results from rational markets are presented in the upper part of the panel, and from 
                                                 
13
 See Dufwenberg et al. (2005) for an explanation why this measure is appropriate to experimental settings with 
known to the subjects last period.  
14
 18 in each of the ten experimental markets. 
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overconfident markets - in the lower part. From Table 1 one can see that prices are on average 
much more overvalued in the overconfident market than in the rational market and this 
difference is significant (Mann Whitney U = 1, p < 0.01, one-sided). 
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b. 
Figure 8: Normalized price deviations from FV by trading period and overconfidence level:  
a. rational market, b. overconfident market 
The Normalized Absolute Deviation is similar to the NPD, and is found as the sum, over all 
transactions of that period, of the absolute deviations of the market prices from fundamental 
value, divided by the total number of stocks in the market (see Equation 4). This measure is 
calculated for each of the periods. Table 1 presents the average value of NAD for each of the 
markets. 
TSN
DEP
NPD
q
i tit   1
)(
      (4) 
NAD measures the dispersion of the contract prices around the fundamental value, and high 
values of NAD point out that large number of transactions are being conducted at prices 
above the fundamental value. Figure 9 depicts absolute price deviations from fundamental 
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value per period for each of the two types of asset market. Results from rational markets are 
presented in the upper part of the panel, and from overconfident - in the lower part. From the 
Table 1 one can say that on average contract prices in the overconfident market differ by more 
experimental units from the fundamental value (22.36 ECU) than in the rational market (4.92 
ECU), and this difference is significant (Mann Whitney U = 1, p < 0.01, one-sided). Since 
there are not many cases of per-share undervaluation relative to fundamental value, there are 
no considerable differences in the values of NAD and NPD.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. 
Figure 9: Normalized absolute price deviations from FV by trading period: a. rational market, 
b. overconfident market  
The Price Amplitude (APL) is the maximum value of the shift of average contract price from 
the fundamental value for an experimental session. It is found as the difference between the 
maximum positive and the maximum negative deviation of the average period price from the 
fundamental value of that period, normalized by the initial fundamental value (see Equation 5). 
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Here, Pt is the average contract price and FVt is the fundamental value in period t. Initial 
fundamental value FV1 = 36 ECU.  
Higher price amplitudes imply greater bubbles, and larger swings in the market price of the asset 
relative to fundamental value, evidence that prices have grown away from their fundamental 
values. From the Table 1 one sees that the price amplitudes in the overconfident market are on 
average more than twice higher than the amplitudes in the rational markets, and this 
difference is highly statistically significant (Mann-Whitney U = 1.00, p < 0.01, one-sided).  
Velocity of the Asset is found by dividing the total number of transactions over the 
experimental session by the total number of stocks in the market. This is the measure of how 
many times an asset “turned over” the market. This measure is connected to the volume of 
trade: the higher is the velocity, the higher is the volume of trade, suggesting, according to 
Noussair and Tucker (2006), either heterogeneous expectations or biases in decision making 
prompting trade. From the Table 1 one can see that the velocity of stocks in the overconfident 
market is significantly higher than in the rational market: on average each stock “turned over” 
6.27 times in the overconfident market, and only 4.38 times in the rational market. This 
difference is significant (Mann Whitney U = 1.50, p < 0.05, one-sided).  
Correlation coefficients between bubble measures and measures of overconfidence (pre-
experimental and forecasting bias scores) are large and significant (see Appendix E). This 
provides additional evidence that overconfidence has a significant effect on pricing and trade 
behavior in experimental asset markets. 
Table 1: Bubble measures in each session  
Session Treatment Hassel-R2 NPD NAD Amplitude Velocity 
1 OVE 0.581 9.144 9.308 1.69 4.61 
2 OVE 0.535 24.908 24.939 2.25 5.94 
3 OVE 0.414 38.257 38.380 2.87 7.89 
4 OVE 0.288 13.008 13.196 1.32 6.50 
5 OVE 0.877 25.874 25.961 3.33 6.39 
6 RAT 0.906 5.745 6.133 1.09 4.56 
7 RAT 0.571 1.769 3.412 0.67 5.94 
8 RAT 0.944 9.593 9.924 1.67 4.28 
9 RAT 0.805 3.781 4.099 1.15 3.56 
10 RAT 0.942 0.983 1.017 0.30 3.67 
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Comparison to other experiments  
Table 2 presents data
15
 from several experiments which had similar structure to mine: in 
which 1) the asset market had duration of 15 periods, and 2) the fundamental value was 
declining each period. In the experiments of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), Porter 
and Smith (1995), Van Boening, Williams, and Le Master (1993) bubble and crash pattern in 
prices is widely observed. On the contrary, experimental sessions of Noussair and Tucker 
(2006) yield practically no bubbles. On average values of Normalized Absolute Deviation
16
 
and the Amplitude from the rational treatment are higher than the values from the “no-
bubbles” experiment of Noussar and Tucker (2006) but are much lower than those obtained 
from the other three experiments, thus there is evidence of the smaller deviations from the 
fundamental value in the rational market treatment. However the turnover value is more than 
four times higher than that of Nourssar and Tucker (2006). Measures obtained from the 
overconfident market treatment are consistent with those observed in previous studies of 
markets of this type. 
Table 2: Average values of some of the bubble measures from previous studies 
Average values from my experiment NAD Velocity Amplitude 
Overconfident market treatment 2.24 6.27 2.29 
Rational market treatment 0.49 4.40 0.98 
Average values from previous research    
Noussair and Tucker (2006) 0.24 0.99 0.33 
Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) 5.68 4.55 1.24 
Porter and Smith (1995) -- 5.49 1.53 
Van Boening, Williams, and Le Master (1993) 5.12 5.05 4.19 
Results presented in this section demonstrate that although bubbles in the rational markets are 
not completely eliminated, they are less severe in comparison to the bubbles in overconfident 
                                                 
15
 Data on the experiments of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), Porter and Smith (1995), Van Boening, 
Williams, and Le Master (1993) are taken from the paper of Noussair and Tucker (2006). 
16
 For the comparison of NAD measure from my experiment to those of the other experiments, it has to be divided by 
10. The reason is that, previous studies used an expected dividend equal to 0.24 ECU is each period; in my 
experiment it is 2.40 ECU. 
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markets: bubble measures calculated for the rational sessions are statistically significantly 
smaller than the ones obtained from the overconfident sessions. Moreover size of the bubble 
measures increases with the increase in market overconfidence. 
7 CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper results of the experiment, designed to investigate the role of market 
overconfidence in the occurrence of stock-prices’ bubbles, are reported. The design of the 
experiment follows Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) and is extended by a new feature, 
in which markets are constructed on the basis of subjects’ overconfidence, measured in pre-
experimental studies. In the experiment two types of the markets are conducted: rational and 
overconfident. Empirical evidence presented in this paper refines differences between market 
outcomes in the experimental treatments and suggests the existence of the connection between 
market overconfidence and market outcomes.  
When there are no asymmetries in information and all traders have identical assets’ and 
currency endowments, and all traders are “homogenous … with statistically rational dividend 
and price expectations” (Gilette et al., 1999) a theory predicts that either no trading should 
occur or some marginal trading at the prices around the fundamental value. Findings from my 
experiment contradict this assumption. I find that trading activity in rational markets is 
significantly higher than zero; however it is significantly lower than in the overconfident 
ones. In the ten sessions of this experiment, it is observed that, higher market overconfidence 
is accompanied by the higher average market prices and larger deviations of the security 
prices from fundamental value. Although average prices in both types of markets significantly 
exceed the fundamental value, prices in rational markets tend to track the fundamental asset 
value more accurately than the prices in the overconfident markets, and are significantly 
lower than the average overconfident prices. Moreover, bubble and burst pattern was 
observed in the aggregated overconfident market, whereas in the rational market no sudden 
drop of the aggregated market price to the fundamental value occurred. Volatility of the prices 
and trade volume proved to be significantly lower in the rational market, as it was 
hypothesized. 
Results show that both constructs that were used in the experiment to measure overconfidence 
(pre-experimental and price-forecasting task bias scores) are linearly strongly dependent, thus 
overconfidence is a robust phenomenon in my sample. Also it is taken as a proof that both 
constructs measure the same phenomenon. The strong positive correlation between market 
outcomes (average market price and trade volume) and overconfidence measures draws 
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conclusion, that an increase in market overconfidence is associated with the increase in 
average price and trading activity. The reduction of the aggregated average market price and 
trade volume over the experiment’s periods is observed. Thus hypothesis that overconfidence 
also reduces to the end of the game was tested. For that, based on the data from the first and 
last seven periods, two bias scores for each market were constructed. Overconfidence measure 
of the first part of the experiment is, in most markets, lower than that of the second part and 
this difference is significant. This finding could serve as an explanation why bubbles burst 
close to the end (or in some cases middle) of the experiment. Menkhoff, Schmidt, and 
Brozynski (2006) find similar results of decrease in overconfidence with experience; however 
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) report that overconfidence increases with the experience.  
Analysis of the five bubble measures (NPD, NAD, Amplitude, Hassel-R2, and Velocity) 
revealed that in the markets formed of overconfident subjects bubbles are more likely to occur 
and that they are significantly larger in magnitude than in rational markets. Large and 
significant correlation between bubble measures and measures of overconfidence provide 
additional evidence that overconfidence has significant effect on price and trading behavior in 
experimental asset markets. Comparison of the selected bubble measures, averaged over five 
rational and overconfident markets, to the measures obtained in other experiments in which 
bubble-crash pattern was observed (e.g. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988) and the 
experiment of Noussair and Tucker (2006) in which bubbles were practically eliminated, 
suggests that there is evidence of the smaller deviations from the fundamental value in the 
rational market treatment than those observed in previous studies of markets of this type. To 
conclude, the analysis of the bubble measures demonstrates that although bubbles in the 
rational markets are not completely eliminated, they are less severe in comparison to the 
bubbles in overconfident markets. Moreover bubble measures increase with the increase in 
market overconfidence.  
Although results presented in this paper shed some light on the effect of overconfidence on 
the processes in experimental financial markets, further investigation of the topic is desirable. 
A promising direction in research is examination of what proportion of overconfident subjects 
in the market is sufficient to influence price departures from fundamental value. For this 
purpose mixed markets of overconfident and rational subjects should be introduced. It would 
also be interesting to study if the results obtained were not dependent on the other factors, e.g. 
risk aversion (if higher overconfidence is not correlated to higher risk aversion). Finally, one 
could investigate the differences in personal behavior and outcomes on the individual level of 
the two types of players (rational and overconfident).  
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APPENDIX A: BIAS SCORE OF THE VARIOUS (EXPERIMENTAL) SUBGROUPS  
Pre-experimental Test 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
201 All 11.78 10.57 -11.33 43.5 
93 Female 9.62 10.68 -11.33 38.89 
108 Male 13.37 10.28 -10.28 43.50 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
3.75                                                        
(0.57) 
-- -- -- 
Experiments 
OBS Group Mean SD Min Max 
60 All 11.20 12.08 -5.89 43.50 
25 Female 9.96 12.45 -5.89 38.89 
35 Male 12.08 11.91 -4.72 43.50 
30 Overconfident 21.33 8.26 10.17 43.50 
30 Rational 1.06 4.03 -5.89 6.78 
 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
2.13                                                 
(0.81) 
-- -- -- 
 
Overconfident vs. 
rational diff. 
20.27                                              
(0.00) 
-- -- -- 
OVE 
market 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
-0.65 
-- -- -- 
(0.64) 
RAT 
market 
Male vs. female 
diff. 
0.68                                                
(0.76) 
-- -- -- 
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APPENDIX B: TRANSLATION OF INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment we are going to create a market in which you will trade units of a fictitious 
asset (i.e. “shares” of a “stock”) that earn a dividend over a series of trading periods. The 
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make appropriate decisions 
YOU MAY EARN A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY which will be PAID TO 
YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment. 
The currency used in the market is called Gulden. All trading and earnings will be in terms of 
Guldens. At the end of experiment, the Guldens that you have accumulated will be converted 
to euros at the exchange rate of 0.27 EUR for each 10 Guldens and you will be paid in euros. 
Note that the more Guldens you earn, the more euros you get! 
Duration of the experiment 
The market will take place over a sequence of 15 trading periods. You may think of each 
trading period as a “business or trading day”. Each trading period has a maximum length of 
180 seconds at which time the market will close for that period. The remaining time left in 
each period will be shown by a clock on your computer screen.  
The market period can be ended before the trading time expires by a UNANIMOUS vote of 
all participants in the market to end trading for that period. This alternative stopping rule 
allows the group as a whole to bypass the usual 180 second stopping rule. Each participant 
can vote by pressing the key labeled VOTE. Pressing VOTE and thus voting to end that 
market period does not eliminate you from participating further in trading for that period; it 
simply says that you are ready to end trading in the current period and move on to the next 
period. 
Initial Endowments of Participants 
Each trader at the beginning of the trading game is endowed by STARTING CAPITAL equal 
to 300 Guldens and 3 units of assets. During the experiment you may purchase or sell assets. 
At the END of each trading period you will receive a DIVIDEND on EACH UNIT asset unit 
in your inventory.  
Dividend Process 
You will not know the exact value of your dividend per unit prior to the end of each trading 
period. At the end of each trading period you will be told the value of your dividend per unit 
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and your dividend earnings (dividend earnings = assets × dividend per unit). They will be 
added to your working capital. 
Your dividends are drawn randomly each period. The possible values of your dividend per 
unit and the associated probability of occurrence are given below:  
dividend 0.0 Gulden 0.8 Gulden 2.8 Gulden 6 Gulden 
probability 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 
Thus, the average dividend over many draws is 2.4 Gulden (=0.0*1/4+0.8*1/4+2.8*1/4+6*1/4) 
Before each trading period information on potential income from holding your assets till the end 
of the experiment (15
th
 period) is provided to assist you in formulation of your market 
decisions. The following information is given to you: maximum, average and minimum 
possible dividends (the same in each period), and maximum, average and minimum earnings 
per inventory unit over the remaining experiment periods.  
Reward scheme 
Your decisions regarding the purchase and sale of asset units and your end-of-period 
inventory level (dividend earnings = dividend per unit × end-of-period inventory) should rest 
on the fact that at the end of the experiment your cash earnings are based on your final 
working capital which equals: 
(300 Gulden starting capital) + (dividend earnings) + (asset sales revenue) - (asset purchase 
cost). 
At the end of the game your assets have no value! 
The rules of the Experimental Market 
Suppose we open the market for Trading Period 1 and that you wish to enter your bid or offer. 
To enter bid (price at which you wish to buy an asset): type in the price for which you wish to 
buy an asset. Then click the box labeled “ENTER BID”. To enter offer (price at which you wish 
to sell an asset): type in the price at which you wish to sell your asset and then click on the box 
“ENTER OFFER”.  
Notice that bids are going to be ranked in the decreasing order on the right side of the screen, 
and sale offers in the increasing order on the left-hand side of the screen. 
Suppose now, that you wish to accept Seller’s offer and purchase one unit of the asset. To do 
this first click the appealing price, standing in the column named “SALES OFFERS”, and 
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then click the button labeled “ACCEPT OFFER”. If you wish to accept Buyer’s bid click on 
the appealing price, standing in the column “BIDS” and then click the button labeled 
“ACCEPT BID”. Note that after a contract has been made, all bids and offers are erased and a 
new auction begins.  
Upon buying/selling one unit of the commodity the transaction price (sales or purchase) will 
be added to (if you have sold), or subtracted from (if you have bought) your working capital 
immediately, same is valid for the assets’ inventory.  
Your inventory at the end of a trading period is carried over to the beginning of the next 
trading period. At the end of each trading period your working capital will be increased by the 
amount of your dividend earnings (dividend earnings = number of units in your inventory × 
dividend per unit). 
You can buy asset units as long as your working capital is greater than or equal to the purchase 
price. If you attempt to enter a bid or accept a seller’s offer that is greater than your working 
capital, the action will be ignored and you will receive an error message on your display screen. 
You can sell assets as long as your inventory is greater than zero. If you attempt to enter an 
offer or accept a buyer’s bid, when you have no assets in your inventory, the action will be 
ignored and you will receive an error message on your display screen. 
Market Information 
At the end of each trading period you will have the opportunity to see the market price 
summary information from the past trading periods, which will include such information as 
average market contract price, the highest, and the lowest market price, volume traded and 
dividend for that period.  
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Additional Means to Earn 
At the end of each trading period you will be asked to enter a forecast of the average contract 
price in the next trading period. Information on the current period’s mean price will be 
available for your inspection prior to entering a forecast. Information on your forecasting 
accuracy, consisting of the actual price, and your price forecast from the past periods will be 
available to your inspection after entering a forecast.  
You will be paid for your predictions, based on their accuracy. The closer the prediction is to 
the actual average market price, the higher is the reward. Reward scheme for predictions’ 
accuracy:  
Level of Accuracy  Earnings  
+/- 5% from the actual price  3 Gulden 
+/- 12.5% from the of actual price  1 Gulden  
+/- 25% from the actual price  0,5 Gulden  
Your income from “forecasting part” will be converted to euros at the same rate as mentioned 
above and paid to you at the conclusion of the experiment. 
In the gap marked “Confidence level” you have to write how confident you are that your price 
forecast is correct! You can use any number between 0% and 100% to express your 
confidence, that your forecast is correct. Thus 0% means that you completely do not believe 
that your forecast can be true, and 100% means that you are completely sure that your 
Forecast will be correct. 
This is the end of the instructions! 
If you have a question that was not fully answered by the instructions please raise your hand and 
ask the experiment monitor before proceeding. 
BEWARE! YOUR EARNINGS MAY SUFFER IF YOU PROCEED INTO THE 
MARKETPLACE WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE INSTRUCTIONS! 
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APPENDIX C: JOINT AVERAGE TURNOVER DEVELOPMENT (a. Rational market,                          
b. Overconfident market) 
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APPENDIX D: DEVELOPMENT OF AVERAGE PRICE AND TRADE VOLUME IN EACH MARKET 
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Overconfident Markets 
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APPENDIX E: SPEARMAN’S RHO CORRELATION COEFFICIENT BETWEEN BIAS SCORES AND 
BUBBLE MEASURES 
* - based on 9 observations 
 BS (pre-experimental) BS (forecasting) 
Hassel R2 
-0.770 
(p<0.05, one-sided) 
-0. 673 
(p<0.05, one-sided) 
NPD 
0.745 
(p<0.01, one-sided) 
0.636 
(p<0.05, one-sided) 
NAD 
0.745 
(p<0.01, one-sided) 
0.636 
(p<0.05, one-sided) 
Velocity 
0.717 
(p<0.01, one-sided) 
0.550
*
 
(p < 0.1, one-sided) 
Amplitude 
0.661 
(p<0.05, one-sided) 
0.515 
(p<0.1, one-sided) 
